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One of the most influential embodiments of social thought emerged in post-revolutionary 
France as an attempt to interpret the epoch-making phenomenon of the Revolution as to its 
origins and consequences. Admittedly there were numerous links to the philosophical and 
political thought of earlier centuries, in particular, the Enlightenment and Scottish moral 
philosophy. But the Terror and the stark divisions in the wake of the French Revolution 
demanded a novel explanation of the significance of these violent events; new interpretations 
of social change and stability were required. From the very beginning, authors who were 
concerned with societal organization in this vein linked the quest for theories about the ‘social 
bond’ in modern society with assumptions about the ‘sexual bond’ (Fraisse, 1992: 49).2 
Auguste Comte is a particularly evident case in point: In no respect did the ‘lamentable 
mental anarchy’ of contemporary society seem more striking to him than in the attempts to 
claim the affranchisment of women. Such claims, he argued in 1843, contradicted the 
hierarchical order of the sexes as it was based in physiology and functional to societal order 
and were worth no more than unscientific sentimentalities, alien to the positive spirit of the 
new human sciences (Comte in Mill, 1899: 245). They bypassed what he believed to be the 
female mission, namely to alleviate the moral ravages of the present on the grounds of her 
domestic nature and her instinctive distaste for all things modern. Charged with the 
dissemination of the secular positivistic religion that Comte had devised to establish social 
cohesion in a perceived anarchistic society, women should act as a veritable bulwark against 
the excesses and anomalies of social change.  
While the decisive ‘metaphysical’, or ‘religious’, turn in Comte’s intellectual 
biography – triggered by his relationship with Clotilde de Vaux – has gone down as a ‘bizarre 
episode’ in the history of the social sciences (Lepenies, 1988: 34), the systematic impact of his 
theory of sexual difference on his conception of sociology was consistently ignored. Not only 
does this omission reveal of a selective dealing with Comte’s work, but it also leaves in the 
dark the embattled terrain on which he devised his theories. While Comte’s socio-
physiological foundation of sexual hierarchy was indeed to be engrained in emerging social 
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theory, it was highly contested at the time – not only by John Stuart Mill whose breaking with 
Comte over the woman’s question is well known, but also by an author who opposed Comte 
with clearly sociological arguments: Jenny P. d’Héricourt.  
If, as his biographers tell us, Auguste Comte had his writing desk faced towards a 
mirror and ‘was always looking at himself’ while writing (Lepenies, 1988: 46), d'Héricourt 
must have worked at an open window. Her thinking was shot through with an empirical 
approach to contemporary society that served as the starting point, reference and correcting 
force for her theoretical work. From that perspective she criticized Comte’s blueprint for 
social order: 
 
It is said, sir, that you no longer read. Indeed, I have noticed this, for you do not appear 
to know anything about the mental and material condition of the various members of 
our French society, in particular as far as my sex is concerned. (D’Héricourt, 1855: 59)  
 
For a long time now, d’Héricourt observed, women had been involved in the social change 
brought about by the Enlightenment, the Revolution and industrialization, leading to their 
becoming part of modern society. And this, she contended, was not, as Comte would have it, a 
sign of social anarchy, but the positive achievement of post-revolutionary society. Those who did 
not take this fact into account when theorizing on modernity, those who denied its legitimacy 
and tried to bring it to a halt by devising opposed normative prescriptions, aimed at nothing less 
than the ‘social annihilation of woman’ (l’annihilation sociale de la femme) (d’Héricourt, 1860a: 
I, 166). To prove the empirical falseness, the political injustice and the conceptual defectiveness 
inherent to this theoretical maneuver was the goal d’Héricourt set herself, devising her work as a 
‘response to the modern innovators’ and calling it a ‘philosophical theory of rights’ (d’Héricourt, 
1860a: I, 8).  
Jenny P. d’Héricourt is today a little-known thinker with neither institutional nor 
academic legitimacy at her time. The consideration her work has been afforded posthumously is 
limited to her advocacy of women’s emancipation and the emancipation of the working classes. 
Yet, it was precisely her concern with women’s relationship to modernity and her critique of 
contemporary theories of sexual difference that steered d’Héricourt’s thinking along the 
sociological tracks that her opponents had left when devoting themselves to the creation of 
various ontologies of sexual difference. However, this very concern entailed her being placed 
exclusively in the history of feminism and catapulted her out of the tradition building efforts in 
sociology to come. Thus, her story is revealing not just as to the history of social thought but also 
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as to mistaken demarcations that organize historiographic work in 19th century intellectual 
history by setting apart the history of feminist thought from the one of emerging human and 
social science disciplines. 
 
‘Daughter of her century’: Biographical outline 
 
Jenny P. d'Héricourt was born Jeanne-Marie-Fabienne Poinsard on 10th September 1809 in 
Besançon.3 Republicanism and enlightened Protestantism characterized her modest middle class 
home environment, her mother being a Calvinist of Swiss origin and her father, a watch-maker, 
coming from the Lutheran village of Héricourt. D'Héricourt would always feel a deep bond to 
her origins. The moral strictness of her mother is often mentioned in her work, and, with the 
pseudonym, ‘d'Héricourt’, that she was to take on after the 1848 Revolution, she was harking 
back to her Protestant origins. After her father’s death in 1817, she moved with her mother to 
Paris, where she obtained a teacher’s diploma in 1827. Five years later she married Michel-
Gabriel-Joseph Marie, an employee at the Bourbon Palace, whom she left after four years. As 
divorce was prohibited in France between 1816 and 1884, she was still officially married at the 
time of her death.  
From 1836 on, d'Héricourt attended private lessons in anatomy, physiology and natural 
history, and obtained a diploma in homeopathic medicine. As access to the academic study of 
medicine was barred to French women up until some time during the 1870s she arranged to be 
trained as a midwife from 1852, received the degree of ‘maîtresse sage femme’, and opened a 
practice for obstetrics and women’s and children’s diseases. The very experience of being 
excluded from academic education became an important motivating force in d'Héricourt’s 
trajectory as an intellectual. Furthermore, her medical practice conveyed her an intimate 
knowledge of female life conditions.  
Calling herself a daughter of her time, a ‘fille de mon siècle’ (d’Héricourt, 1860a: II, 7), 
d’Héricourt pointed up her association not only with the principles of the French Revolution but 
also with post-revolutionary political movements. Already as a young girl, d'Héricourt was 
impressed by the Saint-Simonians, who had taken up ‘the two capital problems of our epoch; the 
emancipation of woman and of the workman‘ (d’Héricourt 1860b: 174 and 1860a: I, 25). In the 
1830s and 1840s, early socialism was to contribute decisively, albeit with an utterly fickle 
attitude, to the discussion about the order of the sexes in modern times. In this period, 
d'Héricourt entered the public arena. In 1844, under the pseudonym of Félix Lamb, she published 
a two-volume novel of social criticism. Starting in 1847 she worked as a staff member at Le 
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populaire, the newspaper of the utopian communist, Etienne Cabet. But soon d'Héricourt left this 
circle, reproaching Cabet for neglecting the woman question. She would now publish under the 
name of Jeanne-Marie in the feminist press, i.e. in La voix des femmes, and, in gentlemen’s 
clubs, she publicly defended women’s claim to equality, becoming co-founder of the Société 
pour l'Émancipation des femmes.4 However, as early as February 1848 it became clear that the 
Second Republic was not going to meet feminist demands for equality. And in 1851, the 
Republican Revolution gave way to the Second Empire.  
Notwithstanding the henceforth repressive political climate, d'Héricourt pressed, in the 
1950s, further onto ‘the ground which men preserve for themselves’ (d’Héricourt cited in Offen, 
1987a: 156) by engaging with the writings of contemporary social theorists. She became part of 
the circle that gathered around the Revue philosophique et religieuse in Paris, a left-wing liberal 
and Protestant journal that was published between 1855 and 1858. This network was all the more 
important for her work as feminists were completely isolated during the Second Empire. In the 
pages of the Revue philosophique et religieuse began the so-called ‘querelle des femmes of the 
Second Empire’, between, among others, Jenny P. d'Héricourt and Juliette Adam on the one side, 
and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Jules Michelet on the other (Moses, 1984: 151-172). However, 
d’Héricourt’s publicity infrastructure was fragile, and finally collapsed: When, in 1857, the 
editors printed two vehemently anticlerical articles of hers, Napoleon III prohibited all further 
publication of the journal.  
In 1860, d’Héricourt’s main, two-volume work La femme affranchie was published 
simultaneously in Brussels and, in a strongly abbreviated English translation entitled A Woman’s 
philosophy of Woman, or Woman Affranchised, in New York.5 In the first volume she gathered 
various critiques of contemporary political movements and social theorists. In a second volume, 
she added a theory of rights, an analysis of the life conditions of women in French society, 
proposals for legal reform and a programme for the organization of a women’s movement. The 
latter included the outlines of a pedagogy which should turn young women into ‘good, 
conscientious trainees in theory, better at sociology and ethics than all our wonderful 
phrasemongers’ (D’Héricourt, 1860a: II, 244).  
In 1863 or 1864 d'Héricourt emigrated to the USA. From roughly 1863 to 1873 she lived 
in Chicago, where she formed close bonds with American women’s rights campaigners and 
established links between the French and American women’s movements. In New York 
d'Héricourt urged the founding of a World Women's League, that could campaign for women’s 
rights and world peace. Having earned her living teaching French, she finally returned to France 
with little in the way of savings. In her luggage she carried two manuscripts that were apparently 
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burned after her death at her instigation: a study of morals and manners in America and a 
fictitious dialogue between three philosophers. Early in 1875 Jenny P. d'Héricourt died of a brain 
hemorrhage. In accordance with her wishes she was buried in a mass grave at Saint-Ouen in 
Paris, the cemetery for paupers. 
 
Modern innovators: The ‘social annihilation’ of women 
 
D’Héricourt began, in La femme affranchie, her evaluation of contemporary theories on sexual 
difference by scrutinizing various streams of utopian socialism or, as she called them, ‘modern 
communists’, ‘political’ (Égalitaires, Unitaires, Icariens) and ‘religious’ (Saint-Simoniens, 
Fusioniens, Philadelphes). While crediting the Saint-Simonians with putting the social question 
and the woman question on the agenda, she refuted the Trinitarian mysticism and delusional 
philosophy of history which informed their theories. Their assertion that men and women were 
equal before God because the latter was androgynous, might be true, wrote d’Héricourt, but is 
irrelevant as it reveals of pure ‘metaphysics’ and, hence, lies outside the reach of positive 
knowledge (d’Héricourt, 1860b: 203 and 1860a: I, 223). Whereas the Saint-Simonians as well as 
the other utopian socialists ‘sensed’ the right principles, she maintained, their theories were 
defective and their utopian blueprints were neither feasible nor desirable. 
More vehemently even, d’Héricourt opposed those who thought they could derive 
theories on women’s role and status from biology and medicine: Jules Michelet, Auguste Comte 
and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. She targeted those authors, when she wrote, in the preface of La 
femme affranchie:  
 
Several of the adversaries of the cause which I defend, have carried the discussion into 
the domain of science, and have not shrunk before the nudity of biological laws and 
anatomical details. I praise them for it; the body being respectable, there is no indecency 
in speaking of the laws which govern it; but as it would be an inconsistency on my part to 
believe that blamable in myself which I approve in them, you will not be surprised that I 
follow them on the ground which they have chosen, persuaded that Science, the chaste 
daughter of Thought, can no more loose her chastity under the pen of a pure woman 
[honnête femme] than under that of a pure man [honnête home]. (D’Héricourt, 1860b: xf 
and 1860a: I, 8-9) 
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In his books, L’Amour (1859) and La femme (1860), the Romantic historian, Jules Michelet 
(1798-1874), had represented woman as being, due to her menstrual cycle, weak, wounded and 
diseased, and thus psychologically volatile. D’Héricourt counters that, in principle, no 
physiological function could ever be morbid, and hence menstruation could not be described as a 
disease. In individual cases, in particular in the upper classes, there could be morbid phenomena, 
but they were exceptions. Therefore, in her view, Michelet was violating the principles of 
rational thinking by concluding general rules from a few exceptions, constructing imaginary laws 
and making these the starting point of his theorizing (d’Héricourt, 1860: 17-32 and 1860a: I, 91-
109). 
As is well known, Auguste Comte (1798-1857), too, claimed to rely on biology and 
physiology when he propagated a hierarchical segregation between men and women as the basis 
of societal order which he believed discernible by means of phrenology and the ‘moral 
physiology’ of the Montpellier school (Comte in Mill, 1899: 32; Honegger, 1991). Women’s 
brain structure, he argued, enabled them to perform emotional, but not intellectual or productive 
functions. Referring to phrenology, for her part, d’Héricourt countered this argument:  
 
Since you believe in Gall and Spurzheim, you know that the encephalon of the two sexes 
is alike, that it is modifiable in both, that all education is founded on this modificability; 
why has it never occurred to you that if man en masse is more rational than woman, it is 
because education, laws and custom have developed in him the anterior lobes of the 
brain; while in woman, education, laws, and custom develop especially the posterior 
lobes of this organ; and why, having established these facts, have you not been led to 
conclude that, since organs are developed only in consequence of the excitants applied to 
them, it is probable that man and woman, subjected to the same cerebral excitants, would 
be developed in the same manner, with the shades of difference peculiar to each 
individuality; and that for woman to be developed harmoniously under her three aspects, 
she must manifest herself socially under three aspects? (D’Héricourt, 1860b: 132-133 and 
1860a: I, 124-125) 
 
Contrary to Comte, d'Héricourt stressed the plasticity of the human brain. As the natural design 
of human beings is capable of being molded, a non-deterministic Nature is the starting point for 
collective or individual development which leads to a ‘second nature’ (d’Héricourt, 1860a: 225) 
acquired through habitualization within a social milieu and under a specific educational 
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influence. Hence, there can be no biological justification for women’s exclusion from production 
and intellectual endeavors:  
 
Be sure, sir, […] in the presence of the physiology of the brain, all theories of 
classification fall to the ground: before the nervous system, women are the equals of men: 
they can be their inferiors only before muscular supremacy, attacked by the invention of 
powder, and about to be reduced to dust by the triumph of mechanism. (D’Héricourt, 
1860b: 133 and 1860a: I, 125) 
 
Whatever different features women and men expose in their faculties, those are, according to 
d’Héricourt’s reasoning, progressively products of social norms. In arguing so, she not only 
attacked Comte’s recourse to a deterministic Nature, but she also undermined his whole 
theoretical system: Reducing the woman’s question to a matter of biology (and assigning it to 
‘social statics’ which he deemed only a prerequisite for ‘social dynamics’ as the proper domain 
of sociology), he declared it to be, at the same time and in a remarkable yet not atypical 
inversion, ‘one of the most fundamental questions of sociology’ (Comte in Mill, 1899: 245). The 
argument goes as follows: Due to their emotional and domestic nature, women are capable of 
stimulating, within the confines of the family, the underdeveloped ‘social instinct’ of men and 
children. Only through this ‘moral refinement’ would men learn to restrain personality – equated 
with egoism – in favor of sociability – equated with altruism – in order thus to acquire the civic 
spirit that would enable them to act outside the home (Comte, 1891: 289-90). Whereas, by way 
of this logic, Comte conferred upon women the responsibility of making sociability possible, he 
kept them apart from society: They are assigned, by nature and function, to the family which is a 
counterpart to society because it binds its members in only a rudimentary specialization of labor. 
At the same time, however, Comte propagated the family as a model for the hierarchical 
organization in a positivistic society since in the family arose women’s subordination to men and 
the one of the younger to the older (Comte, 1975: lesson 50).  
‘Double-bound’ he conceived both family’s relationship to society – as a counterpart and 
a model – and women’s status – as ‘moral missionaries’ charged with the task of solving 
society’s most urgent problems and as a-social beings subject to men’s political control. Both the 
development of altruism and the establishment of hierarchy Comte believed necessary to create 
and organize order in a society built upon modern forms of production which threatened to get 
out of control by exaggerating specialization. Those paradoxes did not escape d’Héricourt’s 
criticism: ‘Upon the whole, you see, my female readers, that if M. Comte believes us weaker 
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than men in body, mind, and character, in return, he believes us better. We are moral providence, 
guardian angels’ (d’Héricourt, 1860b: 129 and 1860a: I, 121).  
Whereas d’Héricourt appears distant in her criticism of Comte, despite all the polemics, 
and whereas she pulled apart his theory with satire and sarcasm, the dispute with Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon (1809-1865) was both more complicated and more hostile. To an initial criticism from 
d’Héricourt Proudhon answered in an unusually invidious tone:  
 
No, Madam, you know nothing of your sex […]. And, if you do not comprehend this 
question; if, in your eight pages of reply to my letter, there are forty paralogisms, it 
results precisely, as I have told you, from your sexual infirmity. I mean by this word, the 
exactness of which is not, perhaps, irreproachable, the quality of your understanding, 
which permits you to seize the relation of things only as far as we, men, place your finger 
upon them. You have in the brain, as in the body, a certain organ incapable by itself of 
overcoming its native inertia, and which the masculine spirit alone is capable of setting in 
motion; and even this does not always succeed. (Proudhon, 1857: 165, cited according to 
the translation in d’Héricourt, 1860b: 48) 
 
As d’Héricourt’s views on social theory, in their emphasis on industrial labor, the division of 
labor and the human rights of the individual, are actually akin to Proudhon’s, he became her 
most important and disturbing opponent. Proudhon advocated the same notions of equality as she 
did, but he applied them only to men, his theorizing of the relationship between the sexes not 
being distinguished from the construction of a Comte, whose rigid authoritarianism was 
otherwise opposed by Proudhon, and not even from that of the Romantic, Michelet. Indeed, 
when it came to women, d’Héricourt observed, Michelet’s and Proudhon’s views were only ‘two 
manifestations of the same kind of thinking’: ‘the sole difference that exists between these 
gentlemen is, that the first is as sweet as honey, and the second as bitter as wormwood’ 
(D’Héricourt, 1860b: 20 and 1860a: I, 94) 
Proudhon’s statements were, indeed, characterized by marked brutality. Instead of 
emancipating women, he suggested one would better lock them up. Since the difference between 
the sexes in the human being corresponds to the difference between species, he argued, woman 
can only ever be a complement to man: ‘housewife or courtesan’, according to his now famous 
saying. Therefore, she can become neither a contracting partner nor a citizen nor a bearer of 
public office which, Proudhon maintains, follows from the fact that woman lacks the capacity to 
produce germs and thus ideas.  
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In her critique, d’Héricourt accuses such reasoning of being based on false analogisms 
and setting up mistaken generalizations:  
 
You chose a few remarkable men, in whom, by a convenient process of abstraction, you 
beheld all men, even to cretins; you here took a few women, without taking into account 
in the slightest degree any differences of culture, instruction, and surroundings, and 
compared them with these eminent men, taking care to forget those that might have 
embarrassed you; then, deducing generals from particulars, creating two entities, you 
drew your conclusions. (D’Héricourt, 1860b: 60 and 1860a: I, 156)  
 
When dealing with men, d’Héricourt argues, Proudhon abstracts from all contexts, qualities and, 
especially, physical features in order to substantiate their equality before the law. When it comes 
to women, however, he legitimizes their subordination by referring to a bundle of anatomical and 
physiological features. Such reasoning boils down to plain discrimination on the basis of sexual 
difference: ‘We find that you accord right to qualities and functions, because the individual is a 
man, and that you cease to recognize it in the same case, because the individual is a woman’ 
(d’Héricourt, 1860b: 221 and 1860a: II, 45).6 This, however, goes against Proudhon’s own 
principles of universal equality, d’Héricourt insists. And the contradictory logic operating here 
rests on false generalizations. At those, d’Héricourt took a close look.  
 
In the depths of metaphysics: Classifying sexes 
 
In a more general chapter of La femme affranchie, d’Héricourt argues that all ‘classifications of 
the sexes’ and all ‘theories of the nature of woman’ incorporate peremptorily false 
generalizations. While ‘men, and women after them, have deemed proper hitherto to class man 
and woman separately; to define each type, and to deduce from this ideal the functions suited to 
each sex’ (d’Héricourt, 1860b: 225 and 1860a: II, 102), neither one nor the others did admit that 
numerous facts refute such classification. Hence, she wrote with a hint at Proudhon, not a 
deficient female capacity for abstraction made her refrain from devising a general theory of 
sexual difference, but the inadequacy of such constructions which could only ever rest on an 
unprovable a priori. In order to illustrate her epistemological objections to any such theorizing, 
she drafted, by way of an intellectual satire, four theoretical scenarios. They all take up elements 
of existing theories while exposing the arbitrary logic of such theorizing in general. In what 
follows, we paraphrase these scenarios (d’Héricourt, 1860b: 226-240 and 1860a: II, 103-118): 
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1st Scenario: Women and men differ solely by their procreative function; all other 
supposedly ‘natural’ distinguishing characteristics can be refuted empirically and exposed as 
products of arbitrary causes. Since the human organs expand or contract according to the 
behavior of human beings, it is education, culture, prejudice or imposed habits that mark the 
brains of women and men differently. Consequently, any education that is not gendered would 
do away with all differences not related to procreation.  
2nd Scenario: The sexes differ physically, intellectually and morally and, consequently, in 
their modes of behavior and activities. This justifies hierarchy, based on the principle that the sex 
more valuable for the evolution of the species is placed above the other. As can be seen in his 
hairiness and deep breathing, man is closer to animality and, hence, an underdeveloped variant of 
woman, standing between her and the species of great apes. Woman, on her side, is the creator 
and custodian of the species since she carrys the human germ inside her, whereas it is uncertain 
whether man is indispensable for procreation. In any case, human science will make his 
procreative performance superfluous in the future.7 In analogy to the human germ, women also 
bear the germ of intellectuality and morality. They are careful observers, whereas men construct 
paradoxes and loose their senses in the depths of metaphysics. They are, by their gentleness, 
morally superior to the brutal and insensitive man. While the muscular man did fulfill a 
civilizing task, humanity’s destiny now lies beyond the mere subjection of Nature and, 
consequently, women must take on the directing of human affairs.  
3rd Scenario: Every classification of the human species is a subjective creation and an 
illusion of the mind. In truth, Nature hates repetition and, hence, no human being resembles 
another. Since the diversity of humanity does not bear classification, the individuality of every 
human being must be respected and the same rights granted to all of them. Human order can only 
arise from competition between free, individual faculties, whereas an artificial order, based on 
classifications, constitutes disorder as it leads to cruelty, oppressing those who do not correspond 
to their assumed type, or compelling them to be hypocrites. The mania for classification has 
borne bitter fruits as the division of humanity into castes, classes and sexes has largely caused 
the misery contemporary society is afflicted with. 
4th Scenario: Female and male organisms are different in all their aspects. Woman has 
more sensitive nerves, fewer compact bones, weaker muscles etc. Intellectual and moral 
differences correspond to these organic ones: their sensitive nervous system makes women more 
susceptible to impressions, physical weakness gives rise to both cunning behavior and a need for 
protection, and motherhood ensures that they will be hostile to destruction. Since women think in 
concrete terms and make keen observations, they are particularly suited to scientific and 
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philosophical activity: They correct the male drive for abstraction, thus dispelling ontologies, 
and they are aware that generalizations are inadmissible. Hence, a genuine philosophy and a true 
science of the human being will bear the mark of both sexes. The same holds true for the 
production of goods, medicine, law, public administration and politics. Precisely because the 
sexes are different, women’s participation is needed in all areas.  
D’Héricourt’s four scenarios take up contemporary theories of sexual difference, 
representing them as a pattern in the logic of which all possible interpretations or ideas can be 
propounded. She disagrees with all four theories proposed, being convinced neither of the 
identity of the sexes nor of the superiority of one, nor of the absence of sexual difference, nor of 
complementary sex characters.8 In a Kantian vein, d’Héricourt questions what all these theories 
must presuppose, i.e. that the essence of a pre-social difference between the sexes is amenable to 
understanding. As this is not possible, theorizing about sexual difference can take as its starting 
point only actual differences between men and women, thus confusing that which is the product 
of education and power relations with a difference that is stated as being beyond the social. And 
this holds true not only for sex, but applies to all ‘classification of the human species, whether in 
castes, in classes, or in sexes’ (d’Héricourt, 1860b: 244 and 1860a: II, 123). However, she does 
not discard the very idea of sexual difference:  
 
We do not give a classification, because we neither have nor can have one; the elements 
for its establishment are lacking. A biological deduction permits us to affirm that such a 
one exists; but it is impossible to disengage its law in the present surroundings; the 
veritable feminine stamp will be known only after one or two centuries of like education 
and equal rights. (D’Héricourt, 1860b: 243 and 1860a: II, 122) 
 
Yet even then, the essence behind the phenomenon of ‘different sexes’ would defy human 
understanding: ‘Our intellect can only recognize the phenomena and the laws governing them, 
not the essence of the things or their ultimate causes. The latter do not belong to the domain of 
science’ (d’Héricourt, 1860a: II, 253). Reality beyond the manifest appearance of phenomena 
could, she said, never be adequately represented by knowledge, because knowledge always 
organizes itself into categories that abstract from the many-facetedness of reality. Concepts 
systematize and classify reality, but do not coincide with it: 
 
We observe concrete phenomena, compare them and establish similarities or differences. 
Our faculty for abstraction enables us to detect individual similarities, and, from them, we 
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construct a phenomenon that only exists in the imagination, that one calls a species, 
group or family etc. But in reality, in Nature, there are only more or less similar or 
dissimilar individual beings: Abstractions are not things. (D’Héricourt, 1860a: II, 250-51) 
 
If objective reality is only manifest in its appearing, the abstracta, ‘woman’ or ‘man’, exist solely 
as qualities of a female or male individual. Like any other phenomenon, belonging to a particular 
sex links an idea about some abstract property (e.g. the color blue or femininity) to the 
manifestation of that property (e.g. a blue flower or a female individual). Now, if the category 
‘sex’ is only conceivable by abstracting from the individuality of all men and women, and, at the 
same time, the quality ‘sex’ is only realized in an individual, sex and individuality can never be 
reduced to each other: ‘There are as many different men and women as there are men and 
women composing the species’ (d’Héricourt, 1860b: 230 and 1860a: II, 14). 
Anti-nominalism, anti-essentialism and anti-realism set up the epistemological 
framework that d’Héricourt lays out for the debate about sexual difference. There may well be a 
pre-social difference, she contends, which, however, only manifests itself in individuals, and 
does not coincide with differences that have been generated socially. Such a pre-social difference 
between the sexes cannot be represented in knowledge, but only tentatively interpreted by means 
of abstraction; thus it always remains the product of intellectual activity. In arguing so, 
d'Héricourt combines the reference to a ‘natural’ – or, more adequately, a non-social – given of 
sexual difference with a social constructivist perspective, thereby linking what polarizes present-
day debates. Beyond biological determinism and radical social constructivism, she adopts a 
constructivist perspective that takes a non-deterministic Nature as its starting point.  
Not interested in countering her opponents’ ‘classifying theories’ with a ‘truer’ theory or 
a more correct ontology of sexual difference, d’Héricourt was concerned with exposing the 
epistemological delimitations of any such theory and analyzing the conceptual grids along which 
differences of social and historical origin are naturalized by such theories. By way of this 
reasoning, d’Héricourt coined ‘sex’ as a social and historical category, conceived of the 
relationship between the sexes as a subject of political dispute capable of being altered and 
opened the phenomenon of sexual difference up to social scientific inquiry.  
 
In their own right: The individual and society  
 
D’Héricourt’s skepticism towards classification gives, on epistemological grounds, priority to 
the individual and regards any subsumption under a type or category with much caution. This 
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skepticism is both embedded in and leading to a concept of cohesion in modern society that, on 
the one hand, differs considerably from Comte’s and, on the other hand, anticipates elements of a 
theorem that Emile Durkheim should later, in a more systematic and explicit fashion, conceive of 
as ‘organic solidarity’.9  
Individuality, d’Héricourt contends against Comte, does not coincide with egoism and 
thus is not, per se, threatening social cohesion. In her view, Comte’s altruistic morality which 
obliges the individual unilaterally to society, is  
 
wrong and unjust; wrong, because it does not take into account the two sides of every 
moral code: the individual and society; unjust, because, if it is bad that the collective is 
absorbed by the individual, it is no less bad that the individual is absorbed by the 
collective. (D’Héricourt, 1855: 57) 
 
Hence her concern with devising a non-reductionist conception of the relation between the 
individual and society which she sets up, in terms of social theory, as a question of social 
cohesion, and, in terms of a just political order, as a relationship made of reciprocal rights and 
duties.  
D’Héricourt defines individuality as a quality that is inherent to every human being, 
since, ‘when looked at analytically, each of us is a society of faculties’ that distinguishes us from 
all others and makes us apt to perform specific functions (d’Héricourt, 1860a: II, 15). ‘Function’ 
as ‘the manifestation of the aptitudes predominating in each of us whether naturally, or in 
consequence of education and habit’ is, on its side, ‘a production of utility’. By way of an 
‘insufficient’ classification she presents a list of such functions: ‘1. Scientific and philosophic 
functions; 2. Industrial functions; 3. Artistic functions; 4. Educational functions; 5. Medical 
functions; 6. Functions for the preservation of safety; 7. Judicial functions; 8. Functions of 
exchange and circulation; 9. Administrative and governmental functions; 10. Legislative 
functions; 11. Functions of solidarity or of social benevolence and of institutions for the 
prevention of crime’ (d’Héricourt, 1860b: 225 and 1860a: 102). Thus, the capacities of each 
person and, hence, her or his individuality, are expressed in professional activity which is 
functional to society, and give rise to a system of specialized production that connects 
individuals through relationships of exchange and cooperation: ‘it is our duty to put ourselves in 
a position which enables us to perform a function that brings benefit to ourselves and others, and 
makes the exchanging of services possible.’ (D’Héricourt, 1860a: II, 238) 
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Admittedly, to this form of structural integration, d'Héricourt does not apply the term 
‘division of labor’ as Durkheim will do later; yet, she establishes a nexus of statements that falls 
under this rubric. And her emphasis clearly rests, as does Durkheim’s – at least in his optimistic 
Division of Labor10 – on the individualizing and integrating effects of differentiation through the 
division of labor. For Durkheim, division of labor is the source of ‘organic solidarity’ which, in 
contrast to ‘mechanical solidarity’, does not integrate people who are alike, but people who are 
different. It becomes possible ‘if each one of us has a sphere of action that is peculiarly our own, 
and consequently a personality’ (Durkheim, 1984: 85). The more divided labor and the more 
personalized activities are, according to Durkheim’s thesis, the stronger will be the social 
cohesion. The very same idea operates in d’Héricourt’s elaboration of what we now call the 
‘functional integration’ of what she called ‘l’organisme social’ (d’Héricourt, 1860a: II, 102), 
building on the analogy between a biological organism and society which informs her 
sociological fragments as well as Durkheim’s sociology. From this, she derives the positive 
evaluation of individualization that distinguishes her from Comte: Individuality does not equal 
egoism and does rather make modern society possible than pose a threat to its cohesion.  
Division of labor, as Durkheim was to go on to argue, cannot be reduced to its economic 
dimension, but has, moreover, a ‘moral character, since needs for order, harmony and social 
solidarity are generally reckoned to be moral ones’ (Durkheim, 1984: 24). Similarly, in 
d’Héricourt’s thinking, the division of labor lays the ground not only for structural but also for 
moral integration in that it sets up cooperative relationships which she conceives as relations of 
mutual rights and duties: Society is  
 
an organized ensemble of human beings who associate in order to grant each other the 
guarantee of exercising their individual Right, to ease the exercise of Duty, to exchange 
goods in equitable way, and to cooperate in the progressive realization of humanity’s 
destiny. (D’Héricourt, 1860a: II, 22)  
 
This is why women fall victim to ‘social annihilation’, if the most fundamental of all rights and 
the most fundamental of all duties are denied them, i.e. the right to determine their actions on the 
basis of their individual talents, and the duty of fulfilling a useful function that benefits others. 
For this reason, performing a function according to individual – and not sexually stereotyped – 
aptitude, is, as the starting point of structural and moral integration, the primary route to the 
emancipation of women: they could ‘only be affranchised through labor’ (d’Héricourt, 1860b: 
175 and 1860a: II, 26).  
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As becomes clear in this argument, mutual rights and duties bind the individual not only 
to other individuals but also to society as a whole since not only does the performance of 
functions serve the satisfaction of other individuals’ needs, but it also benefit society. All 
aptitudes that make up an individual, d’Héricourt contends, are ‘entitled to be performed because 
all of them are necessary to achieve the harmony of the whole’ – and this ‘whole’ can be 
understood as the whole personality as well as the whole of society to which the harmonious 
personality contributes (d’Héricourt, 1860a: II, 15). Hence, society, for its own sake, owes its 
members the right to their individuality because ‘the enjoyment of the individual right guarantees 
social progress, since that progress depends on the free unfolding of faculties, and those faculties 
can only develop in a context of liberty’ (d’Héricourt, 1860a: II, 14-15).  
Arguing that a social existence consists of both individualization and incorporation into 
the collective, d’Héricourt vanquished two opposing interpretations of society: Neither is the 
individual the end and society the means, as would correspond to utilitarian social theories, nor is 
society the end and the individual only a means, as Comte had propounded. Albeit in a rather 
fragmented way and not yet in the terms elaborated later in sociological theory, d'Héricourt 
hereby acquired a set of problems that would be continued in the history of social thought: With 
Durkheim, the question of how to reconcile a ‘regulated social order with individual liberty and 
personal autonomy’ was to become the central problem of sociological theory (Müller and 
Schmid, 1996: 481).  
 
The recognition of rights: Towards the limits of individualism 
 
D’Héricourt’s epistemological and sociological emphasis on the non-reductive quality of any 
individual human being is restrained when it comes to policy. Despite her thoroughgoing critique 
of classifying theories, she considers some pragmatic classification indispensable for policy in a 
society marked by segregation and disparity of power. This ‘classification for social practice’ 
(d’Héricourt, 1860b: 246 and 1860a: II, 125) she presents as an analytical tool that is intended to 
make the fact of segregation visible; but, like every other mode of classification, it has to be 
understood as an abstraction, and its interpretation of reality as a provisional hypothesis. Policy 
built on that, d’Héricourt insists, should always point to the socio-historical genesis of factual 
differences, and strive for change in the present which she understands as ‘l’époque transitoire’ 
(d’Héricourt, 1860a: II, 199). These considerations inform her theory of the progressive 
acquirement of rights.  
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According to d’Héricourt, equality before the law breaks down into a sequence of four 
forms of right to which all human beings are fundamentally entitled. The first, ‘natural right’ 
(Droit naturel), entitles to liberty, autonomy and self-realization. Second, ‘civil right’ (Droit 
civil) grants equal status before the civil law to all human beings who have reached the age of 
majority and are of sound mind. The devising of a non-patriarchal marital law is of major 
concern here. Third, the ‘economic right’ (Droit économique) is intended to guarantee equality in 
the ‘sphere of exchange’ and access to work. From these three rights there emerges the interest 
of the rightsholders in participating in decisions made about the establishment of the law and the 
organization of institutions. Only when they participate in these decision-making processes are 
human beings completely free, because, then, the only laws they have to submit to are those to 
the determination of which they have contributed. This is what the ‘political right’ (Droit 
politique), or citizenship, consists in (d’Héricourt, 1860a: II, 23-25; cf. in the English translation: 
chapter ‘Summary of the proposed reforms’). 
As all human beings are as such entitled to natural, civil, economic and political rights, 
those rights cannot be refused, or bestowed, in fact. Rather, they are ‘recognized’ on certain 
conditions, namely ‘when we are in a condition to exercise and to demand it; and we prove that 
we are in a condition to exercise it when we satisfy the conditions fixed by the law’ (d’Héricourt, 
1860b: 305 and 1860a: II, 189). While those conditions are very concrete (age of majority etc.) 
when it comes to the recognition of rights of an individual, they are more general when the 
question arises whether the category of rightsholders should be extended. As to political right, 
for instance, 
 
the practical truth […] is that it is profitable to recognize political rights only to the extent 
to which it is demanded, because those who do not demand it are intellectually incapable 
of making use of it, and because if they should exercise it, in a majority of cases, it would 
be against their own interests […]. (D’Héricourt, 1860b: 301 and 1860a: II, 185) 
 
Both the capacity to exercise a right and the desire to be recognized as a rightsholder are 
acquired through the practice of the preceding right, d’Héricourt contends. While women are, as 
of now, not ready to assume their political rights since they ‘do not demand [it], but laugh at 
those who address them on the subject’, they are ripe for the preceding phase: ‘You are prepared 
for the civil right, the exercising and practicing of which will give you the maturity you need for 
the political right’ (d’Héricourt, 1860a: II, 63). By arguing so, she distanced herself from claims 
for the immediate introduction of women’s right to vote, cautioning that if the recognition of a 
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right is not based on an analysis of the actual state of mind and social status of the future 
rightsholders it would lead to ‘anarchy and regression, not progress’ (D’Héricourt, 1860a: II, 64-
65). 
Although these arguments can justly be interpreted as revealing of elitism, they do not 
simply imply a class bias.11 That women are not yet ready to have their political right recognized 
because they are ‘minors civilly, slaves of prejudices, deprived of general education, submissive 
for the most part to the influence of their husbands, lovers or confessors’ (D’Héricourt, 1860b: 
301 and 1860a: II, 185) she does not state as a matter of class. And she takes into account the 
fact that women of the lower classes have even fewer opportunities for education and thus hardly 
any opportunities to acquire the intellectual prerequisites for political rights by demanding a 




Fear of disintegration challenged post-revolutionary theorizing about modern societies. Thinkers 
such as Comte reacted to this by fashioning a ‘social bond’ to which women’s equality with men 
and both their individualized and socialized existence fell victim. Here emerges a strand in social 
theorizing that other classical sociologist would also feel bound by, decades later. According to 
this tradition, there are two stratification systems in society. One differentiates men from women; 
the other differentiates men from each other. In both systems, differentiation increases as 
modernization progresses, intensifying solidarity and thereby testifying to the progress of 
modern civilization. Whereas men are involved in this process as individuals, women are only 
differentiated as a group or type, distinguished from ‘the man’ as ‘the woman’, but not as 
individuals among each other, nor as female individuals from male individuals. Within this 
framework, another risk of disintegration had to be countered, namely the one brought about not 
by post-revolutionary fractures but by excessive differentiation that was believed to loom large in 
modern societies. To this threat of ‘anomie’ Durkheim offered two strategies consistent with the 
concept of double stratification: first, the strengthening of the institution of marriage intended to 
guarantee cohesion between the sexes and to protect man from anomic tendencies, second, the 
creation of professional associations intended to ensure cohesion among men (Durkheim, 1922; 
Marshall, 2002; Lehmann, 1991; Roth, 1989/90).  
D’Héricourt challenged the concept of double stratification from its very outset, putting 
forward an interpretation of integration in modern societies that does not come to a halt at the 
demarcation drawn by ‘sex’. No individual should have to sacrifice their individuality to a sex 
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stereotype, and no society, for its own sake, may depend on such a sacrifice in order to secure 
cohesion. From this perspective there arose the theoretical challenge of conceptualizing the 
relationship between the individual and society in a non-reductionist way. In conceiving this 
problem lies what deserves to be called d’Héricourt’s classic contribution to sociological 
thought. Classic it can be considered as for the radicalism with which she put this core problem 
of sociology: without taking recourse to sexual stratification. Contrary to her fellow social 
theorists up to the last third of the 20th century, she saw cohesion in a differentiated society as 
being guaranteed when all members, regardless of their sex, can realize their individuality. 
Consequently, as long as women are subsumed under a sex type and as long as their social 
existence is confined to the family, society’s full potential for integration will remain unused.  
By thus substantiating the feminist claim for emancipation not only on the basis of a 
philosophy of equality but also on the basis of social theory, d’Héricourt could postulate equal 
status as an ethical requirement and as a social necessity. Thereby, she extended the feminist 
discourse by adding a sociological dimension to it, while, at the same time, freeing sociological 
discourse from its limitations brought about by ontologies of sexual difference and the concept 
of double stratification that precluded the posing of sociology’s core problem in its most radical 
form. 
Yet, d’Héricourt’s version of conceptualizing of social cohesion has not been handed 
down continuously in social theory. Thus, not only has a sociological question been posed only 
half-heartedly, but also, following d’Héricourt, a part of social reality has become a taboo: The 
‘social annihilation’ she criticized was a matter of theory, institutions, mores and laws – it did, 
however, not correspond to the intellectual and economic transformations which, indeed, did 
involve women: 
 
Since woman is no longer engrossed in the household and the care of children, but, on the 
contrary, has an ever growing proportion of the production of the national and individual 
wealth, it is self-evident that she needs liberty and independence, and that she must have 
an entirely different position in the family and in affairs outside the home from that of the 
past. (D’Héricourt, 1860a: II, 273) 
 
In d’Héricourt’s view, not the female claims for emancipation did constitute anarchy, as Comte 
would have it. But the discrepancy between actual capacities and activities of women, on the one 
hand, and institutions and ideas that preserved what was believed to be a pre-modern order of the 
sexes, on the other hand, generated a social pathology – hence the need for reform. And this need 
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d’Héricourt states with a sense of urgency: ‘I claim the rights of woman’, she wrote, ‘because the 
progress of enlightenment, in which woman participates, has transformed her in social power, 
and because this new power produces evil in default of the good which it is not permitted to do’ 
(D’Héricourt, 1860b: X and 1860a: I, 7). While we leave it to historical interpretation to judge 
the accuracy of this prognosis, we would like to argue that its formulation exposes, once again, 
the embattled nature of the terrain on which theories on modern society emerged. Most visibly 
embattled they were to an extent that raises a provocative question: Should we consider the long-
lasting theorizing of women’s adversity to modernity and men’s exclusive capacity to embody 
the modern subject not just as a discourse that triumphed over its external critics but as a reaction 
to internal challenges that have become invisible only retrospectively because they were, in 
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1 A longer German version of this article includes an exhaustive bibliography of d’Héricourt’s writing (Arni and 
Honegger, 1998). We would like to thank Joan W. Scott for her careful reading and precise comments upon an 
earlier version of this paper as well as the anonymous reviewers of JCS for their perceptive insights. 
2 For work on the link between concepts of societal order and theories of sexual difference in sociology, cf. among 
many others: Sydie, 1987; Honegger and Wobbe 1998; Marshall and Witz 2004. 
3 There is little archival material, allowing only a rough reconstruction of d’Héricourt’s life. Most information 
comes from what is probably a veiled autobiographical text that was published in 1896 in an American women’s 
journal. That text is available in the original English version and in a French translation (Offen, 1987a and Offen, 
1987b). The biographical details were verified and supplemented by Karen Offen. Few additional information can 
be found in the book by Alessandra Anteghini (1988). Carlo Montalbetti (1981) studied d'Héricour’s role as an 
initiator of the Italian women’s movement; Florence Rochefort (2000) considered her in the context of protestant 
Feminism, and, recently, Alice Primi examined her interest in history (Primi, 2006). For d’Héricourt’s writing 
within the context of intellectual history and the history of social thought cf. Arni and Honegger, 1998; Arni, 2001.  
4 Whether d'Héricourt is identical to the early feminist, Jeanne-Marie, is disputed; we are provisionally assuming it, 
in common with Offen.  
5 In the following, we quote, whenever possible, from the American translation while indicating references for both 
the French and the American edition.  
21 
                                                                                                                                                       
6 D’Héricourt thus formulated a criticism of the inversion of abstract individualism, the turning of a principle of 
universal inclusion into a principle of exclusion, which, from 1789, rationalized the rejection of claims for women’s 
equality; cf. Scott, 1996. 
7 This is a hint to Comte’s procreative utopia of parthenogenesis and asexual reproduction which he envisaged as a 
further “purification” of sexual difference and gender roles. 
8 Her views seem to have changed, however, towards the end of her life: In later writings she argues that both sexes 
have to be represented in society because of their very complementary difference.  
9 There exists a personal connection between d’Héricourt and Durkheim: Charles Renouvier who was a close friend 
and collaborator of d’Héricourt was also a teacher of Durkheim. Although we have not yet any evidence for this, the 
possibility that Durkheim knew d’Héricourt’s writings can not be discarded. 
10 If Durkheim was, concerning integration through the division of labor, as optimistic in The Division of Labor in 
Society as d’Héricourt, in Suicide (1897), he diagnosed deficient integration and a moral crisis, which he tried to 
overcome – much in Comte’s vein – at the expense of female individualization.  
11 Nor do they, actually, differentiate between men and women: As to women’s questionable maturity to exercise the 
political right, the same holds true, d’Héricourt writes, when it comes to men – however, rights that once have been 
recognized cannot be withdrawn. Cf. for the class bias interpretation: Moses, 1984: 172. 
